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The paper reviews and synthesises the theoretical analyses of the brain drain in the earlier 
Iiterature and in the present symposium in the Journal on the subject. Static analysis and 
dynamic analysis are distinguished, critical issues are raised relating to how welfare changes 
should be discussed in the context of migration, and possibilities of fruitful future research are 
outlined. 
1. htroductlon 
This paper rettiewa the literature on the thecnetical analysis of the welfare 
effects of the brain drain, The different theoretical analyses, with their occasion- 
all;/ divergent c~;nclusion:,9, can be illuminatingly classified according to whether: 
(i) they deal with compamtive-static or dynamic formulations; (ii) they assume a 
perfectly competitive mode; or on.e with endogenous market or policy-imposed 
distortions; and (iii) they address themselves to the welfare of the country of 
emigrazion or of immigraLn, or take a world-welfare viewpoint. 
Rn the following review, we begin (section 2) briefly with a discussion of the 
last set of issues distinguished above, namely, whose welfare should be con- 
sidered and how welfare should be d’efined. We next turn, in section 3, to the 
early, theoretical literature which has focussed on comparative-static anrlyqes 
in perfectly competitivs niodels. In section 4, we turn to analyses which allow for 
distortions: policy-impos,ed (e.g., educational subsidies) and endogenou:; (e.g.. 
*Earl Grinols and Qint D:asgupta have provided excellent research assistauce in the cc :~se 
of writing this paper. The ‘irsi. author took primary responsibility for preparing the prelii!~inar). 
drafts of the sections on static analysis and the second author for the section on dynamic 
analysis; the final outcome is Ihowever jointly authored in the full sense of the term. Thanks are 
due to Harry Johnson and Al Berry for helpful comments. 
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rigid or sticky real wages). Finally, in section 5, we review the dynamic analyses 
of the effects of the brain drain.’ 
In reviewing the literature, we naturally synthesise and marginally extend it. 
-41~0, we provide an analytical taxonomy into which the theoretical contribu- 
tions in this volume can be, and are, appropriately fitted, and hence their 
relationship to the foregoing contributions and to one another is more readily 
assessed by the reader. 
2. Welfare: Whose and how de&xl 
2.1. 
A central problem in the analysis of migration relates to the question: whose 
welfare is being assessed? Even if we assume away intergenerational welfare 
problems (such as those raised by Bawls (1971) recently), the modern migration 
of skilled personnel raises in an acute form the question as to whether the welfare 
of these migrants is to be considered part of the welfare of the LDC (or, for that 
matter, as in a recent UNCTAD study (1974), part of the welfare of the DC). 
If migration were permanent, so that the immigrant could be taken to have 
left the LDC and arrived in the DC on a for-ever basis, then it would make some 
sense to consider the question as to what has happened to ‘LDC welfare’ as 
identical to the questif,n as to what has happened to the ‘welfare of those left 
behind in ,the LDC’. However, skilled (PTK in U.S. immigration terminology: 
professional, technical and kindred) migrants today - including those who take 
permanent-residence visas in the DC of immigration and are immigrants in the 
juridical sense as well as in popular parlance - typically move to and fro between 
the LDC of origin and the DC of destination (and indeed, en route, to other DCs 
and LDCs at times). Hence, PTK immigrants are not really permanent migrants 
in many cases. 
However, even in the case of permanent, for-ever migrants, it is not entirely 
clear that they should beexc1udeJ altogether from thedefinition of’LDC welfare’. 
Skilled immigrants today enjoy low transport costs which permit frequent returns 
to the LDCs of origin and hence retention of LDC loyalties and affiliations. Their 
job opportunities also now tend to cut across different DCs, increasing their 
capacity to resist the assimilative pressures of the DC in which they reside - a 
passionate immigrant into the UK, who will not adapt to British phlegm, may be 
able to migrate to the back-slapping friendliness of the U.S. or to a convex 
combination of ~the two culturles in Canada. The identification with the DC of 
‘We should enter the caveat explicitly that our review is by no means exhaustive but touches 
rather on what appear to us to be interesting contributions from the viewpoint of our focus in 
this paper. Furthe.rmore, we confine ourselves to explicitly theoretical analyses, using formal 
models in one way or another: hence we do not review early writings of interest such as 
Johnson’s (1965) article on the Canadian brain drain. 
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destination is not quite so inevitable In consequence. Furthermore, the melting 
pot now has itself melted in the US,, the principal DC of immigration: ethnic 
sdiversity is encouraged and Dr. Kissinger finds his Realpolitik hamstrung by 
ethnic groups whose political and emotional affiliation to countries of emi~ation 
is considered a thoraughly acceptable part of the domestic political process, 
Thus, several factors have combined to make a continuing link to LDCs of 
origin and failure to fuse into DCs of destination important aspects of modern, 
PTK migration from LDCs to DCs. This observation, plus the fact of extensive 
‘to-and-fro’ migration, make it somewhat implausible to assert that, if one is 
interested in LDC welfare, one must exclude the welfare of the migrants from the 
analysis. identically, any procedure which defines ‘DC welfare’ as inclusive of 
the PTK immigrants’ welfare runs into the same difficulties plus the additional 
fact that, despite the selective regulation of immigration in the national interest 
by the legislative and executive branches of DC governments, the average citizen 
of a DC is more likely to regard the immigrant’s welfare as a ‘favour’ to the immi- 
grant at the DC-citizens’ ‘expense’ than as an augmentation of DC welfare! 
It is best therefore to analyse the welfare issues separately for three groups : 
(i) LDC nonemigrants; (ii) migrants; and (iii) DC non-immigrants. Then, depen- 
ding on what is appropriate for the analysis of any specific situation, one can add 
together any of the three components to arrive at what is considered to be ‘LDC 
welfare’ or ‘DC welfare’: clearly, no general rules will apply to all situations, 
Among tile other implications of to-and-fro migration by migrants, we mi& 
also note one consequence of some analytical interest. While the ~~~e~~er~cffZ 
models to be reviewed presently allow for migration from the LDC to the DC in 
the context of a variety of models of the LDC, none of them allow for the ‘reeurn 
of the native’. Once the return migration is allowed for, one can open up interest- 
ing possibilities for theoretical analysis: the modelling of the DC, implying 
possible learning effects for the (temporary) migrant, for example, could become 
relevant so that the two-way migration relates to the same (physical) migrant but 
implies unequal flows in the two directions from 1 he viewpoint of welfare analy:,is. 
A &period analysis of the welfare impact of such to-and-fro migrt.tion would 
then be called for and would involve the effect of cl~anging locations on the 
efficiency and wealth of the migrant in an essential way. 
2.2. 
Next, we ought to distinguish explicitly between the conventional economist’s 
objective function, which admits only goods and %ervices, and augmented 
objective functions, which allow ‘noneconomic’ arguments in the objective 
function as in the analysis of optimal policy intervention to achieve nonecon- 
omic objectives in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969). 
The explicitly theoretical literature to be presently reviewed 1s exclusively 
focussed on the conventional obiective function. However, the fact that cncieties 
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may value the presence of technical personnel per se in the interest of modernisa- 
tion or the possibly associated increase in the size of the ‘modern’, industrial 
sector’s activity level is manifestly an important as>pect of societal concerns, and 
the economist evaluating the welfare effects of tire brain drain must come to 
terms with these traditionally political, sociological, ‘noneconomic objectives. 
This is indeed what McCulloch and Yellen (197’5) do when they discuss the 
possible ‘demodernisation’ effect of an emigration tax in their model of the brain 
drain at the Bellagio conference. 
2.3. 
At a different level, the economic analyst may not be able to continue using a 
well-ordered social utility function because there are no fiscal policy instruments 
by which incomes can be redistributed in the desired manner. In this event, 
explicit attention to the (actual) income distributions before and after migration 
is required for welfare analysis. Thus, in Hamada’s (1975) Bellagio contribution, 
incomes curz be redistributed but, in the absence of lump-sum tzxation as a 
feasible alternative, only via the income tax : hence income distribution and per 
capita income levels are both to be analysed for examining the welfare conse- 
quences of emigration. 
2.4. 
Similarly, if we depart from the assumption of full employment of factors of 
production, then the effect of emigration on the unemployment levels (or rates) 
could well be an additional, ‘economic’ argument in the objective function: as is 
done in the Bhagwati-Hamada (1974) paper. 
2.5. 
Finally, we may note that dynamic welfare analyses would necessarily take the 
theorist into intertemporal optimisation: and, in this case (as is evident from our 
detailed analysis in section 5), the welfare presumptions established from static, 
.welfare analysis do not necessarily carry over. 
3. Static, welfare theorising without distortions 
The focus of most theoretical analyses has been on LDC nonemigrants’ 
welfare, using comparative statics and models without distortions, and assum- 
ing permanent migration. These contributions can be reviewed in ascending order 
of complexity. 
3.1. .iocllel I: One-product, orwfactor-emigration model 
The simp!cst neoclassical :nodel which has been used for analysing the impact 
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of migration on the welfare of the LDC nonemigrants is the one-product model 
with just one factor (labour) migrating at the margin in a closed economy. 
In this model, used by Grubel and Scott (1966), it was argued correctly that, 
for infinitesimal changes, the emigrant will neither harm nor help the non- 
emigrants: the emigrant will have been coqiributing his marginal product to 
national income and earning it as well,. so that his presence or absence is irrek- 
vant to the nonemigrants’ welfare. To put it graphically, the emigrant will be 
merely sailing away with ‘his own marginal. product. 
However, forjkite changes, as was noted by Berry and Soligo (1969) and later 
independently by Tobin (1974), there is the familiar ‘surplus’ that the noner ri- 
grants lose. This is seen readily in fig. 1, where the marginal product of labc,ur 




function. The finite emigration of FG amount of labour then results i:~ a loss cf 
surplus of the shaded area CDE. 
Note one more point that is sometimes the source of critical confusion. If we 
draw in an average product of labour (APL) schedule, it is clear that, for both 
infinitesimal and finite changes, the per capita income of the econo;w;; will rise 
(from KG to JF in fig. 1) with emigration as a simple consequence of the assumed 
diminishing returns. How does this reconcile with the conclusion ;h-tflt the in- 
finitesimal migrarlon does not affect the welfare of those left behind?Theparadox 
is only apparent. t;:e emigrant earns not the per capita incoml:: in the prr- 
migration situaiion, but rather the marginal product. The per capita income 
comparison, to be a correct welfare index of the impact 011 those ieft behind, 
would have to presume :%t the migrant earned average, rather than margir a!, 
product: in this case, since the 3 Ycrage exceeds the marginai product. the migrant 
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was contributing less to national income than earning and making demand on it, 
so that his migration helps those left behind.2 
3.2. MO&I 2: Two-product, two-jktor, one-factor-emigration model 
The extension of the preceding analysis of one-factor-emigration to the stan- 
dard trade-theoretic model of two products and two primary factoas has been 
carried out by Kenen (1971) in the Kindleberger Festschrift. Its substance can be 
readily derived as follows. 
For a closed economy, start with given equilibrium. When labour migrates 
infinitesimally, the Rybczynski theorem implies that, at constant commodity 
prices, the output of the labour-intensive commodity will fall and that of the 
capital-intensive commodity will rise. Since domestic income and expenditure 
fall, however, the asSumptiOn of noninferiority in consumption, combined with 
stability, will yield in the post-emigration, full-equilibrium situation a reduced 
(relative) commodity price for the capital-intensive commodity. Next, turn to 
fig. 2a, which sketches the production possibility set of the nonemigrants as AB. 
in the before-migration situation, the commodity price-ratio is FQ and the 
welfare of the nonmigrant group is at U,. With the emigration, the commodity 
price-ratio shifts, as just argued, to SR and the nonemigrants get worse off 
(U, > U,). It is easy to see the source of this loss: the ‘trade opportunity’ of the 
T 
E 
L-intensive Comm. X 
Fig. 2a. 
‘For those familiar with peasant-family-farming models in the Lewis-type literature on 
dualism, where average product rewards to family members are assumed, the per capita 
income of the farrlI:ng sector would become the relesfant welfare index. It does not seem 
relevant, however, tc the problem of international migration. 
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nonmigrants, from the presence of (and with) the migrants, disappears with the 
emigration. 
Consider now the extension to 3n open economy. If international prices are 
fixed by the ‘small country’ assumption, let PQ = P’Q” be the given international 
prices in fig, 2b. PP’ is the Rybc~~yns~i-line for changing Iabour supply. Before 
the migration, the totnl population has the production ::et CD, the nonmigrants 
have the production set AB, the nonmi~rants’ welfare is at &, and potential 
emigrants earn income RS in terms of commodity X. When migration occurs, 
the migrants essentially disappear with their constant marginal product and, a: 
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the unchanged commodity price-ratio, the nonmigrants are left as well off as 
before (U, = V,). The presence or the absence of the migrant group in the 
population implies the same terms of trade, and hence the same trade oppor- 
tunity, for the nonmigrants: hence the no-impact result (for infinitesimal and 
finite migration). 
If the terms of trade can vary, however, it follows similarly that the welfare of 
the nonmigrants will improve or worsen according as the terms of trade improve 
or worsen.3 In the case illustrated in fig. 2a, the nonmigrants export commodity 
X for comlmodity Y and the after-migration improvement in the terms of trade 
improves their welfare (U,” > U,). 
Note finally that this strict relationship between the terms of trade behaviour 
and the nonemigrants’ welfare will not hold for Model 1, for finite emigration, 
because whereas the emigration at constant prices implies in Model 2 a constant 
marginal product for labour owing to the Rybczynski theorem, recall that in the 
one-good Model 1 we have: a declining marginal product to labour schedule. 
Hence, for Model 1, we have to set off the loss of the surplus (CDE in fig. I) 
against the terms of trade gain, if any, to arrive at the net impact of the migration 
on nonemigrants’ welfare. Thus, in fig. 2c, OA represents the production possi- 
bility set of the nonemigrants, with specialisation throughout on producing X as 
required by Model 1; AC represents the production attributable to the potentlad 
migrants; and AB represents the surplus (CDE in fig. I) that accrues to the non- 
emigrants. Thus, prior to emigration, with terms of trade BR, we have Ion- 
emigrants’ welfare at [I,. With the migration, the terms of trade improve to ,4Q 
but the surplus is lost so that the nonmigrants’ budget line is now anchored on A 
rather than B. Fig. 2c shows that U, > U,, i.e., that the terms cf trade gain is 
outweighed by the loss of the surplus. The contrary possibility illso exists and 
could equally well have been illustrated. 
3.3. Mm/cl 3: One-product; t*ro-factor, two-factor-emigration model 
A different extension of the closed-economy Model 1, retainl.#o the one- 
product framework but permitting tw;, factors to emigrate in L ;wo-factors 
framework, is due to Johnson (1967). It is derived, in turn, from the Berry-Soligo 
paper and is best set out in terms of fig. 3. 
Assume two groups: nonemigrants (I) and emrgrants (2). The former group 
has K, and L, units of capital and labour whereas the latter has K, and L, such 
units The overall wage-rental ratio (o/y) is a function of the o1:erall K/L ratio, 
lc, where K = K, +K, and L = L, +L,. In fig. 3, we then have the post-emi- 
gration-of-group-2 equilibrium at Q and (0, Y)~, is the wage-rental ratio tangent 
-This conclusion naturally holds only insofar as the trade pattern for the nonmigrant group 
is not reversed by the m&r&ion, This qualification, explicitly noted by Menen, has its counher- 
part in our review of the dynamic a:lalyscs where the effects of dissimilar smit?gs behaviour by 
migrants and nonmigrants are considered. 
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Fig. 3 . 
to the XI isoquant. XI is therefore the post-migration income of group i. How 
does this compare with the pre-migration income level? There are two possibili- 
ties to consider but both sho;v a worsening of welfare (except for a singular case 
of no impact) from the migration. The entire range of feasible (o/y) ratios before 
migration can be divided into (i) the range spanned by QR and QC, which would 
m3terialise clearly if k2 > k, (where k, = K,/L, and k, = K,/L,) and thus 
k > k,; and (ii) the range spanned by QS and QD which would material& if 
k2 < k,. The singular case is where k2 = k, :-= k and therefore ((L)/Y)~, = 
(a/~)~. It follows immediately that, when k2 > k, y so that it is the richer group 
that emigrates, the wage-to-rental ratio will fall to (a/~)~,; in the othler case. 
where k2 < kl, it will rise to (w/JJ)~,. In either case, the ‘budget line’ for group 1 
will shrink in the relevant range and will imply ZOSS of income. To read off this 
loss of income, all that one has to do, in the case ,where k, > k, for example, is 
to draw the (w/Y)~ line through Q and take its tangency with respect to the X, 
isoquant ; clearly ,X, > XI and (X, - X,) is the loss of income to group 1 from 
the migration of group 2. 
It follows equally that the nonemigrant group 1 will become better oSf if the 
wage-rental ratio rises (falls) when k2 > k,(k, < k,). This can happen if. when 
k, z=- k, for example, the emigrants leave a sufficient amount of their capital 
behind to raise (instead of lowering) the overall capital-labour ratio, k, with 
emigration. 
The same conclusions can be readily d.erived in the context of yet another 
familiar diagrammatic techniquc.4 Take fig. 4. It measures the capita!-labour 
jAsim Dasgupta suggested this diagrar,watic treatment 10 us, independently of having seen 
fig, 5 in section 5, after seeing thz preliminary draft of section 3. 
per eapit3 ifMxmes ?‘I 
I axis, Writing the 
fundon in the intensive fcmn as y 
we cspn cmily show that the factor rewds. 7 
per capita income of the mm- 
k sf two possi- 
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bilities: where k < k, and k > k,. In the latter case as weli, if fg. 4 is so redrawn, 
there will be a measure T,T: of per capita income loss for group 1. 5 
Finally, note that it should be possible to derive the results of Model 1 as a 
special case of Model 3: for Moder 1 is where one may think of two factors 
emigrating, but with one factor (capital) taking zero value. ‘With the emigrant 
group 2 then b&g labour-abundant, we have the case where k < k, and the 
wage-rental ratio rises after emigration: so we are in the range (QS - QD) in 
fig. 3 and in the configuration shown in fig. 4 and, in each instance of course, we 
get the expected loss of income for the nonemigrant group I. 
Consider next the extension to an open economy. For the simplest case 
(considered by Johnson) of a small country with fixed terms of trade, and staying 
within the Samuelson range of incomplete speclalisation in production, it is 
immediately obvious that the emigration of group 2, for k $ k,, will leave group 
1 no better or worse off than before the migration. 
3.4. M&l 4: Otte-product, three-factor, two-factor-emigration model 
In his contribution to the Bellagio conference, Grubel (1975) works with a 
simple mod9 where skilled workers, unskilled workers and capital combine to 
produce a single output and the skilled workers (‘engineers’) migrate with the 
capital embodied in their acquired skills. The ma.in results of his geometrical 
analysis are readily derived, while relaxing his assumption that skilled and 
unskilled labourers must be used in fixed proportions, as follows. Thus, consider 
the system : 
L= L,+L,, (2) 
R = K,+kL,, (3) 
?tihere 0 is output, L, is the number of engineers, L, the .number of workers, E 
‘he stock of total labour, K the cynital stock, k the units of capital required (Le., 
used up) to train an engineer, and Kc the capital left over to be employed with L, 
;rnd L, to produce output 0. 
Assuming that the system will work elficientl;! so as to maximise output, we 
CNI then easily determine t.le effect of emigration on per capita income. The 
implication of the efficiency assumption can be first spelled out simply by using 
the envelope theorem. Thus substitute the constraints (2) and (3) into O(a): 
0 = #(R -kL,, L,, Z-L,). (4) 
SThe above results can also be simply derived by noting that dy,/dk = (k, - ‘c)(dy/dk). 
From this it also follows that, for infinitesimal emig;;ion, the cost of the emigration to the 
nonemigrant group goes to zero b fhe limit and may virtually be treated as zero. 
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For a maximum, it is necessary that 
P,(-k)+e,+e,(-1)] = 0, (5) 
where Bi is the ith partial derivative and I, 2,3 refer to the first (K,), second (L,) 
and third (L,) arguments in the function O( -)- 
3.4.1. First consider the emigration of unskilled labour. Now: 
a, = [wk)+e,+e,(- l)lTEt e3 
= 03 (using (5)). (6) 
Hence, if unskilled labour emigrates, the loss of national income will be equal to 
the marginal product of the labour; thus an infinitesimal move will not harm 
these left behind. Next, we may examine the impact of the emigration on per 
capita incomes : 
WI L) t(dO/dr;)- 4 O3 0 1 
YE-= E2 =L-LZr=Z (7) 
As one would intuitively expect, therefore, the per capita product will rise or fall 
according as the marginal product to labour (0,) falls below or exceeds the 
average product of labour (O/Z). 
3.4.2. Next, consider the emigration of an engineer, implying the ‘loss’ of the k 
units ofcapital along with a unit of labour. 
Therefore, 
de 
z +e dL 2-&+U3(1 -dL,,/dL) 
An-i then 
= 0,k-M3 (again using (5)). (8) 
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where, now, the bracketed term includes the marginal product of labour plus the 
‘lost’ marginal product of the capital emigrating via the engineer. Again, we have 
the intuitive results on the impact of infinitesimal emigration of skilled labour 
on the natiorial income (and hence zero-impact on those left behind) and on the 
per capita income of the society. 
It is futile to talk cf ‘presumptions’ of loss or gain from emigration. But the 
weight of the arguments above is that, except. for the no-impact outcome for 
infinitesimal emigration, the different models seem to lead to a prima facie 
presumption of a loss to those left behind even under conditions of perfect 
competition. The magnitude of this loss is of course conditional on the pro- 
duction functions assumed for the analysis; and as every undergraduate student 
of economics now must know, ‘high’ or ‘low’ costs can emerge depending on 
whether the elasticity of substitution in production is assumed to be low or high, 
in turn.(j 
4. Static, welfare theorising with distortions 
The theoretical literature embodying distortions, whether policy-imposed or 
endogenous (in Bhagwati’s (1971) terminology), is rather sparse, although the 
awareness that such distortions can affect the welfare analysis of the brain drain 
is fairly widespread. 
The first paper to consider distortions in a systematic, general-equilibrium 
framework was by Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). It considers two distorTions: 
an educational subsidy (which is a policy-imposed distortion) and a sticky wage 
(which is an endogenous distortion). The model, in view of the sticky wage, 
permits unemployment ‘in the Harris-Todaro (197G) fashion. At the same time, 
the model enables the authors to analyse the consequences of what is aptly 
called the ‘emulation’ effect: the possibility that migration of educated labour can 
raise the sticky wage as the LDC Joneses emulate and try to keep up with the DC 
Joneses. 
An interesting variation on this model is provided by McCulloch and Yellen 
(1975) in their Bellagio paper. They modify the Harris-Todaro approach so as to 
enable the sticky wage to respond partialf) to the degree of unemployment; at 
the same time, as in one of the Bhagwati-Hamada (1974) variants, they assume 
that all educational costs are privately borne (i.e., that there is no policy- 
imposed distnrtion via an educational subsidy).7 
bThis must be kept in mind by any urasophisticated reader of Johnson’s (1967, app. 111) 
illustrative, ‘small’, cost calculations for the Cobb-Douglas case, even though one is only 
belabouring the obvious here. It is perfectly clear that, by assuming a different production 
function (e.g., the fixed-coefficients Leontief variety), one can generate ‘large’ losses. One 
important implica;ion, again hardly unobvious, is that the cost of the brain drain could very 
well vary with the kind of professionals one is discussing. 
‘There pre other points of difference between the Bhagwati-Hamada and the McCulloch- 
yellen models which the readers can note for themselves: they are not pertinent to the discus- 
sion in the text. 
208 J. Bhugwati, C. Rodrigrtez, Welfare-theoret.‘cal arlalyscs of the brain drab 
Both papers lead to more complex welfare analysis than the models without 
distortions in section 2. They enable one to consider, for example, unemploy- 
ment as an argument in the objective function. Moreover, there is no longer any 
necessary equality between the income lost to a country by migration and the 
wage that the (infinitesimal) migrant earns: the GrubelScott proposition is 
predictably invalid. 
Finally, two important results from this type of analysis may be noted. First, 
it is often argued that if only the emigrant paid for the educational subsidy he 
had received, that would suffice to leave no adverse welfare impact on those left 
behind; the Bhagwati-Hamada analysis - of the cases where the educational 
cost is internalised, and where it is not but the country of immigration compen- 
sates the LDC for the educztional cost of the immigrant - shows that this is not 
a valid conclusion. 
Second, there is a schooi of thought which argues that the emigration of PTK 
manpower from LDCs, whf n there is unemployment, will not harm the LDCs : 
that, in fact, we have here an ‘overflow’ or ‘safety-valve’, rather than a ‘drain’, 
phenomenon. Graphically, as Walter Adams put it to the first author of this 
paper, ‘1 saw doctors driving taxicabs in Manila; why should we worry about 
their migrating abroad?’ It is clear from the Bhagwati-Hamada analysis that the 
emigration, by raising the ex,yectec! return to doctors, can cause further expan- 
sion of education and hence lead to loss of income; and that the emulation effect 
can make cvcn act& returns to doctors higher than they might have been, thus 
reinforcing the loss in income. 
Further. as the Hamada-Bhagwati (1975) analysis at Bellagio models the 
point at issue, it is not really meaningful to think of that doctor as driving 
taxicabs iTI Manila forever. He is almost certainly ‘waiting’ to clear his ECFMG 
to migrate to the U.S. If the possibility of migration to the US. were not avail- 
able, he ,would at some stage stop wasting his skills and being a cabdriver and, 
since returns to being a doctor in Manila are clearly low, he would migrate 
internally: to the smaller cities where he could practice medicine. The external 
brain drain (from Manila to New York) therefore inhibits the (desirable) 
internal diffusion (ot:t of-Manila into the hinterland).8 And, even if one pretends 
that doctors ear:’ the vaLte of their marginal product (in and out of Manila, in 
the Philippines), the above argument shows that the social marginal product of 
the doctor who is ‘unemployed’ qua doctor is not zero, rontrary to the argument 
of Adams. 
In short, the a-:;umption that lOTK personnel who are unemployed at any one 
point of time cat1 therefore emigrate at no loss of rnsrginal product to their 
“The diffusion of doriors l’rom Manila into the hinterland is the slow, capitalist equivalent 
of the Maoist policy of ‘sending” doctors to the countryside. In India, there is growing evidence 
that doctors in major cities are now opening offices in the adjacent towns, visiting there for 
periods such as one day a \\eck, thus effectively ‘migrating’ partially to the hinterland: flirting 
is easier than marriage! 
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society I:, based on the faulty reasoning which assumes that they will forever so 
remrLln and omits taking into account the ‘search process’ aspect of the labour 
market. And, it ignores additional welfare implications which could follow from 
phenomena such as the Bhagwati-Hamada emulation effect.’ 
5. Dynamic analyses of international migration 
The dynamic treatment of the consequences of migration, whether unskilled or 
skilied, is more recent; besides, the number of contributions in this framework is 
yet relatively small. 
The dynamic models naturally divide into those which concentrate on steady- 
state analysis, such G:; Berry and Soligo (1969), McC’ulloch and Yellen (1974) 
and P.odriguez (1975a), and those which additionally or exclusively describe :he 
transition of the economy outside the steady state, as in Mishan and Keedlcman 
( 1968) and Rodriguez (1975b). 
At the same time, their common dynamic feature is the explicit introductio:l of 
capital as a factor of production and the ability of the economy to change the 
level of its capital stock by means of savings: domestic or foreign. Furthermore, 
the papers addressed to the brain drain, as distinct from what might be called 
Ricardian labour migration of the purely unskilled variety, incorporate a second 
produced factor of production: education as human capital. Moreover, all the 
papers reviewed focus not on world-welfare effects, but on the welfare implica- 
tions of the migration on the nonmigrant populations of the countries of im- 
migration or emigration. Finally, in regard to the measures of welfare changes, 
the most widely used are the per capita income of native residents together with 
the relative factor rewards as indicators of the income distribution, although 
Berry-Soligo and Rodriguez (1975a) follow a utilitarian approach and prcceed to 
evaluate the full changes in the levels of utility enjoyed, the former by means of 
consumer surplus analysis and the latter by the first-order change in the station- 
ary level of utility enjoyed by each individual in the context of a life-cycle model 
of saving.’ O 
Finally, we must note that, in contrast to the static analyses reviewed in earlier 
sections, labour mobility in a d,ynamic context can be analysed (i) as a once-and- 
for-all labor movement, or instead (ii) as a rate of migration per unit of time 
which may, in turn, be either constant or varying over time according to the 
changing domestic or foreign conditio:ls. 
“The precise implications of build ng these interpretations of unemployment into the model 
used for anaiysing the effects of brain drain will depend, of course, on how the rest of the model 
is put together. This should be obvi!ous to the reader from contrasting the analyses in, say, 
Bhagwati-Hamada (19741, McCulloch-Yellen (1475) and Hamada-Bhagwati (1975). 
loIn none of the dynamic models either, therefore, is the issue of to-and-fro migral ion 
addressed: emigrants leave for good and the welfare of those left behicd is what is considered. 
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In case (i), it is clear that a once-and-for-all labor movement will not affect any 
of the steady-state values of the relevant per capita variables, provided we assume 
that migrants have the same preferences as those of the indigenous population. 
Under those circumstances, the labor movement can be considered as a change 
in one of the initial conditions (i.e., initial population) such that the steady state 
of the economy (if it exists) will be unaffected by it. If, however, a steady state 
does not exist (as in tine of the cases discussed by Mishan-Needleman because of 
their inclusion of Hicks-neutral technological progress in a Solow-type growth 
model), even a once-and-for-all inflow of labor with the same preferences as the 
indigenous population will have permanent effects on the long-run paths of the 
per capita variables. When migrants have different preferences from those of the 
rest, however, even a once-and-for-all migration will change the preference 
structure of the population and will thus have both short- and long-run effects 
on the economy (provided, of course, that those preferences are transmitted to 
their children). With the exception of McCulloch-Yellen (1974) and Mishan- 
Needleman, all the other articles reviewed here introduce differences in prefer- 
ences in one way or another. 
In case (ii), where migration is a continuous process through time, we again 
have to distinguish between two different problems: (a) a constant or variable 
migration rate will change the rate of. population growth and thus the steady- 
state requirements of per capita savings, and (b) the preferences of the migrants 
may differ from those of the rest. In either case it is clear that a continuous 
migration process will affect both the transition and the steady-state behaviour of 
the economy. 
5.2. The dytfanic models of Ricordian labow migrution 
This subsection concentrates O”I the modeis that treat labourasa homogeneous 
input (contrary to those, discussed in the next subsection, which additionally 
consider ski!led labour). 
5.2.1. Of the analyses treating international migration in a dynamic context, 
the Mishan-Needleman pape- is probably the one which provides the clearest 
link between the static and dymlmic models. Their production structure is the 
same as that of the Solow-type growth model: one-sector, neoclassical tech- 
nology with two inputs: capital and labor. Savings (equated to investment) are a 
constant fraction of income and population reproduces at a constant exponential 
rate. Immigrzlts have the same preferences (i.e., savings ratio) as the natives and 
are assumed to enter the country of immigration in a constar,t number per year. 
After the immigrant group of a given year ‘enters the country, it starts reproduc- 
ing itself at the same exponential rate as, the natives. Since one of the main 
objectives of’ the analysis is to investigate the effects of immigration on the 
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welfare of the indigenous population, they incorporate those born to she immi- 
grants (i.e., their descendants) into the stock of the immigrant popu1ation.l’ 
Thesesimpleassumptionsprovidean ideal framework to test in a dynamic model 
the static propositions that a discrete labor inflow (outflow) will decrease (in- 
crease) aggregate per capita income but raise (reduce) the per capita ircome of 
those who were previously in the country (left behind). In this case, c.f course, 
the focus of analysis is on the time-paths of the different measures of per capita 
income. 
Mishan and Needleman do not solve explicitly their model in order to find out 
the qualitative properties of the growth path but rather they postulale a CES 
production function and, using various sets of pa.rameters values presumably 
appropriate to the UK, they proceed to simulate the paths of the relevant vari- 
ables for ‘L thirty-year horizon. Some of their results seem to confirm those of the 
static analysis: for all of the 30 years aggregate income per capita falls short of 
that under no immigration, while the wage--rental ratio is consistently lower 
under the immigration regime. However, their results for the effects on the per 
capita income of the indigenous population do, in some cases (notably, when the 
production function is Cobb-Douglas), differ from what would be expected: in 
the Cobb-Douglas case the per capita income of the indigenous population falls 
short (instead of being in excess) of that under no imtnigration for the first 21 
years. This seems an unusual conclusion in light of the neoclassical nature of the 
assumptions. We think, however, that a possible explanation for that lies in their 
treatment of overhead capital. They assume that a constant fraction of total 
savings is required for the formation of overhead capital, which IS not directly 
productive; although in the text they assume that such savings are provided by 
the immigrants, the equations that they si;llulatc do not show it but rather imply 
that the immigrants’ savings for overhead capital are provided by the indigenous 
population at the expense of their own accumulation of physical capital, which 
of course tendI, to reduce their own per capita income [Mishan and Needleman 
(1968, eqs. 13 iind 18)]. Furthermore, the momc:nt the immigrant set&s in the 
country there is an au -‘ditlnnal requirement for ovtsrhead capital, which is assumed 
to be provided by the indigenous population. 
Abstracting from the formation of overhead capital and their assumption of 
a positive constant rate of technical progress, the effects of a once-and-for-ail 
immigrant inflow in the Mishan-Needleman model can be described, in a 
perhaps more *Ilaminating way, as follows. 
Let Q = .F’(K, L) = L.(k) be the neoclassical production function for the 
composite good Q which can be either consumed or transformed into phywal 
capital. The total labor force can be divided into that of indigenous origin, L,, 
“Again, there is room here for debate. Even where the immigrants are treated as different 
loom the country of immigration, would it not be unrealistic to assume that those born of 
F +-generation immigrants will still be ‘second-class’ citizens forever <in the unfolding of our ._._- 
dynamic model)? 
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and that of immigrant origin, L,. Since both immigrants and indigenous reli- 
dents have the same savings ratio, the capital-labor ratio of the economy 
changes through time according to the standard formula, 
J K = gji(k;)-n.k, 
where r2 is the rate of population growth. At time to, when the once-and-for-all 
immigration takes place, there is a jump in the capital-labor ratio from k, = 
AL to k, = K(to)/{Ld(tO)+L,(to)), where I-&) is the size of the 
immigrant inflow. From t, on, immigration ceases but the initial immigrant 
population starts reproducing itself at the rate n, while at the same time they 
save ‘he same fraction of their income as the rest of the population, In conse- 
quence, the capital-labor ratio of the economy, after the initial jump at t,, starts 
changing through time according to (! 0). 
The amount of capital per head orc~& by the immigrant population then 
changes according to 
(2)4,, = s.~m-n.k,, 
where yrn is the per capita income of the immigrant population and equals the 
sum of their wage earnings, o(k), plus the earnings from the capital they own, 
y(k)k,. Notice that given competition and constant returns to scale the wage 
rate and the rental rate, w and y, are functions only of the economy’s aggregate 
capital-labor ratio k. In fig. 5, per capita income and savings are represented on 
the vertical axis al-ii ratios of capital to population on the horizontal axis. The 
curve 9 = f(k) shows the aggregate per capita mcome as a function of the 
aggregate capital-labor ratio; the curve nk shows the steady-state investment 
requirements; and finally, the curve s+(k) shows the aggregate per capita savings. 
We assume that, before the immigration, the economy had reached the steady- 
state level of the capital-labor ratio ko. After the immigration, the capital-labor 
ratio falls instantaneously to k, and aggregate income per capita consequently 
falls to k,B from the higher level koD. The reduction in the capital-labor ratio 
increases the rental rate anti reduces the wage rate (which is now given by the 
distance OA along the vertical axis). Since initially immigrants have no capital, 
their income is equal to the !- age rate OA, clearly lower than the aggregate per 
capita income which also includes the earnings from the capital stock. Even 
though the aggregate capital--labor ::atio has been reduced, the per capita amount 
of capital own~rl by the indigenous population remains unchanged at k,. Thus, 
the per capita income of the indigenous population immediately after the im- 
migrant inflow is equal to the new wage rate, 0.4, plus the rental rate (the slope 
of the line AC times their per capita holdings of capital, or the distance k,,C 
which exceeds the per capita income they had before the immigration by the 




amount CD. Thus, the short-run effect of immigration is to ray r: the per capita 
income of the indigenous population.” 
Following the impact effect, it is clear that for the new capital-labor ratio k,, 
aggregate savings exceed the amount of inv’estment required to keep it at the 
same level and thus it will start rising, according to eq. (lo), until eventually it 
will reapproach the pre-immigration steady-state value k,. Them are thus no 
long-run effects on the aggregate per capita income or capital-labor ratio from 
a once-and-for-all immigrant inEow. Initially, however, the per capita income of 
the indigenous population has been increased above the original steady-state 
level; thus, their per capita savings will exceed the amount required to keep the 
amount of capital per-head they own ‘constant. In consequence, the ratio of 
capital per head owned by the indigenous population, k,, will start rising. It is 
clear that during the transition process f’or which k < k, it wilt also be k, > kOT 
and thus the per capita income of the indigenous residents will exceed its pre- 
immigration steady-state value. Eventually, however, the aggregate capnal- 
labor ratio will approach kO and remain there. At this moment k, may be slso 
equal to k, or still larger. If it is equal, the income per capita of the indigenous 
population will be the same as the aggregate per capita income, and thus kd will 
behave in the same way as k and. will reniain constant. If iid still exceeds k, while 
/; = kc,, then kd must be falling and finally approaching k,: for the set of Pactor 
rewards implied by k = k,, any kd lari;er than kO implies that the per capita 
1 *The reader may here profitably recall our analysis of fig. 4. 
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savings of the indigenous residents fa 1: short of the investment required to keep 
it constant. For example, for k = k. and kd = k2 > ko, per capita savings of 
the indigenous population are k2F (the line EF is tangent to the function sf(k,) 
at the point k ,,; thus the slope of the line is q(k,)) while the steady-state invest- 
ment requirements are Gk2, which clearly exceed krF; thus, k, must be falling 
and eventually approaching the pre-immigration level ko. 
To conclude, following a once-and-for-all inflow of foreign labor into the 
country, the basic assumptions of the Mishan-Needleman model imply that the 
income per capita of the indigenous population will be raised above the pre- 
immigration level and remain above it during all the transition period until the 
economy again reaches the pre-immigration steady-state level for all per capita 
variables. 
5.12. To the extent that the assumption of equal tastes helped to rule out any 
steady-state effects of migration, the most natural extension at this point is to 
inquire about the nature of steady-state effects when the preferences of migrants 
difier from those of the rest (in particular, when the saving ratios differ). As it 
happens, this is precisely the question addressed by Berry-Soligo (1969) and 
Rodriguez (1975a), to whose analyses we now turn. 
Both papers dilfer from Mrshan-Needleman in at least two basic respects: 
(I) Savhgs behavior is derived from the individual’s maximisation of life- 
time utility. This, in general, implies that the saving ratios are not constant but 
rather depend on factor rewards. Individuals do not all have the same utility 
function. 
(2) Both papers are concerned with the et%cts of emigration on the welfare of 
those left behind rather than the effects of immigration on the welfare of the 
cnous population of the receiving country; it is obvious, however, that both 
questions are different sides of the same coin. 
H;aGcally, their ~haviora~ assumption is that of a life-cycle model of savings 
where individuals work when they are young and save for their retirement. In 
this comext, the interest rate uot only plays the role of being the return to the 
lrtrtor of ~r~~ction ‘capital” ut also determines the trade-off between present 
(wurking period) and future (retirement period) consumption. As proved 
eh~~hcrc ~S~~~~I~~~I~ (1958), Diamond (1965)), a competitive market will in 
~~r~~~~~ fail to attain the optimal ‘golden rule” level of the capital-labor ratio (for 
va IIiCh interc~t rate equals the rrlte of population growth) at which society’s 
COrlsu LW ~~~tcj~ti~l is; ~~~~~~~jscd and the optimal distribution of consump- 
To the extent therefore that emigration or 
tite savings ratio of the population, and thus the 
r ratio, there can be aggregate social gains 
move ir; towards or away from the golden 
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For the members of each individual group (characterised by a set of prefer- 
ences) these aggregate gains or losses must be modified to the extent that the 
.ndividual differs from the average: the change in the steady-state capital-labor 
ratio brings about changes in relative factor rewards which in turn redistribute 
income in favor of the group which is relatively better endowed with the factor 
whose reward has increased in relative terms. For example, if there are only two 
groups of individuals, high savers and low savers, emigration of some members 
of the high-savers group will in general reduce the new steady-state capital- 
labor ratio (through the reduction in the aggregate savings ratio of the popula- 
tion}. If the capital-labor ratio was initially below its golden rule level (i.e., the 
interest rate was larger than the rate of population growth), this move must 
decrease welfare in the aggregate. The lower capital intensity, in turn, decreases 
the wage-rental ratio and thus redistributes income towards those remaining 
members of the high-savers group (those with a higher preference for the owner- 
ship of capital) and away from the low savers. It follows that, on both counts, 
the members of the low-savings group tend to be worse off while the remaining 
members of the high-savings group may be either worse off or better off. ‘#hen 
low saiers emigrate, the capital-labor ratio will be increased and, if the move- 
ment is towards the golden rule ratio, there is a gain in th e aggregate and a 
redistr&ution of income towards the remaining low saver:; (the wage-rental 
ratio rises). Thus, on both counts, the remaining low savers are better off while 
the effect on high savers is ambiguous. 
It follows from the above analysis that if the capital-labor ratio is below its 
golden rule level, in the long run emigration of high savers (-.+hich decreases the 
capital-labor ratio even further) will make at least one group worse off, while 
emigration of low savers will make at least one group better off. If, however, the 
capital-labor ratio was above the golden rule level, those conclusions should 
be reversed since in this case reductions in the capital-labor ratio are beneficial 
in the aggregate. 
5 1.3. To summarisc, in this section we have concentrated on the description 
of dynamic models of labor migration where migrants may or may not differ 
from the rest of the population in regard to their preferences for the accumula- 
tion of physical capita!. If everyone’s preferences are identical and migration is 
a once-and-for-all phenomenon, there are in general no steady-state effects of 
migration; the gair,s of &he populati 3n c,f the receiving country (or losses to those 
remaining in the coantry of origin) >nhich appear in the static models also appear 
in this case, except that these gains (or losses) occur in the transitional period 
during which the economy approaches the original steady state. These transi- 
tional g&ins or losses are shown to depend critically on the per capita ownership 
of capital by the economic agents and the transitional change in the econom),‘: 
factor proportions (and factor rewards) brought about by the migration. 
When migrants differ from the rest cf the population in their savings habits, 
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we have not merely the transitional gains or losses referred to above, but also the 
permanent &an* in the steady state of the economy due to the now different 
aggregate savings behavior. These effects can be divided into two parts: (i) 
effects of movements in the steady-state capital-labor ratio towards or away 
from the golden rule ratio; and (ii) effects of changes in the steady-state distribu- 
tion of income due to the new prevailing set of factor rewards and the different 
preferences of members of the population for the ownership of factors of pro- 
duction. 
We tu:n next to the brain drain models whose basic feature is that human 
capital, in addition to unskilled labor and physical capital, appears as a distinc- 
tive factor of production. Human capital is assumed to beaccutrulated through an 
educational procees which uses up some of society’s scarce res!surces. 
To the extent that competition prevails everywhere, including the educational 
market, it is clear that allowing for the international mobility of educated people 
amounts to little more than an extension of the issues discussed in the previous 
section to the context of a three-factor model. Neither of the two papers in this 
area [McCulloch-,Yellen (19?4) and Rodriguez (1975b)]. however, could be 
described as a straightforward three-factor extension of the models analysed so 
far. The main differences arc: 
( I ) The educational market is not assumed to be perfect, either because educa- 
tion is not competitively supplied or becaug, thanks to the existence of capital 
market imperfections or information costs. the rates of return to physical and 
human capital are not epualised, 
(2) Rather thiln considering an exogenous population movement or migra- 
tion rate, the two papers consider as exogenous the foreign rewards of the inter- 
nationally mobile factor) and the mi&ration preferences of those factors in res- 
pony to the rates of re-urn from international emigration. Since these rates of 
return depend not only an the I”oreign rewards but also on the domestic rewards 
iind the COSIS of the move, it follows that the actual migration rates will he 
cndq+ncrusly determined within the system. 
(3) The Rodriguez (197Sb) analysis a&o includes the case of’ labor market 
di\tortaon~ ol’ the type analyl;ed in Harris--Todaro (1910). which were also 
di\cus\ce in a star~c framework in Bhugwati-Hamada 11974) and Hamada- 
Hllrqzwatl ( 1975). 
The pa,xr which most closely a,qzroximates the other dynamic models previ- 
ously discussed is sCulloch-Ycllcn ( 1974). which concentrates on the study of 
the stead)-state effects on the distributior; of income of migration of educated 
(skilled) pLopDe within the context of the following basic assumptions: 
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(1) Only one good is produced, with a constant-returns-to-scale technology 
and three factors: physical capital, skilled (educated) labor and unskilled labor. 
(2) Education (the acquisition of skills) is carried on until the point where the 
skilled-unskilled wage differential equals the cost of acquiring the education 
which, in turn, increases with the fraction of the newly-born population getting 
educated. The educational cost may be either the marginal or average cost 
depending on the kind of market structure which prevails in this sector. For the 
purposes of making the comparison, they convert the once-and-for-all education 
cost into a constant flow per time unit, using an exogenously given discount rate. 
(3) Migration is carried on until the fclreign-domestic wage differential for 
skilled labor equals the flow-equivalent migration cost. Unskilled labor does not 
migrate. 
(4) The domestic rate of return on physical capital is equalised with the 
foreign rate of return by assuming perfect international mobility of foreign 
capital at constant rental. 
Given these assumptions and a constant rate of population growth, the result 
is, in general, a nonzero migration rate for skilled labor. This is so because there 
is no reason why the steady-state output of the educational sector will be con- 
sistent with the maintenance of that particular stock of skilled labor relative to 
the other factors which precisely generates a domestic skilled wage such that 
emigration or immigration is ilot attractive. There is, however, a band equal to 
the foreign skiiled wage plus or minus the migration cost such that if the steady- 
state domestic skilled wage falls within it, no migration will occur. 
The steady-stzte factor rewards for skilled and unskilled labor, migration rate 
and education I Ite will then depend on certain exogenous parameters, among 
them the foreigr wage for skilled labor, the foreign rental on capital, the migra- 
tion cost and the interest rate used for discounting investments in human capital 
or migration. In fact, reduced to its barest essentials, the basic assumptions of 
this model imply the following steady-state relationships. Assuming that the 
steady state is consistent with net emigration of skilled labor (a similar analysis 
follows easily in the case of immigration), the domestic ski!led wage is pegged at 
the world level minus the migration cost (converted into a constant-flow equiva- 
lent). The thus-determined skilled wage plus constant rental on capital (equal to 
the world rental) suffice to determine all the steady-state factor proportions in 
production (the ratios of capital to skilled and unskilled labor) and therefore, by 
implication, the unskilled wage and also the skilled-unskilled wage differential. 
The wage differential, in turn, determines the fraction of the newiy-born popula- 
tion acquiring education via assumpt,on (2) above. Since for a steady state the 
growth rate of the skilled labor force must equal that of the total labor force 
(such that factor proportions remain constant), the equilibrium migration rate is 
then obtained as the difference between the growth rate in the stock of skilled 
people, implied 5y the already-determined equilibrium factor proportions and 
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the fraction of those newly&m getting educated, and the rate of population 
growth.’ 3 
From these relatively simple relationships it is then easy to derive the steady- 
state responses of several endogenous variables to changes in the exogenous 
parameters. For example, an increase in the cost of emigration (or equivalently, 
an emigration tax or a fall in the foreign skilled wage) reduces the domestic 
skilled wage by the same amount. Given the constant rental on capital and the 
constant-returns-to-scale techr ology, reductions in the skilled wage are associ- 
ated with increases in the unskilled wage; thus the skilled-unskilled wage differ- 
ential must unambiguously fall. The fall in the skilled-unskilled wage ratio makes 
skilled labor more attractive for use in production than unskilled labor and thus 
the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is increased. Similarly, the lower wage 
differential makes education less attractive and thus the fraction of the newly- 
4orn getting educated falls. The lower output of the educational secctor plus the 
higher steady-state requirement of skilled labor relative to the unskilled un- 
amb;guousiy impiies a reduction in the rate ofemigration. 
i’he only other dynamic analysis of skilled migration is by Rodriguez (1975b). 
It concentrates on the d$erentiui attitudes of individuals .egarding the decisions 
of capital accumulation, educalion and migration. Rather than postulating that 
education is carried on by everyone up to the point where the wage differential 
equals the (flow-equivalent) ed.ucation cost, he assumes that all those born to 
educated (skilled) parents will get educated imsptwiw ofcosts and returns (at 
least within the rclcvant range), while only a fraction of those born to unedu- 
cated parents will seek education (this fracrion depending on the pecuniary rate 
of return to education) Similarly, migration does not necessarily close the gap 
bttwecn foreign and domestic wages (allowing for the migration cost) but rather 
tl+e fraction of the skilled population which chooses co migrate is assumed to be a 
function of the rate of return to such a move. It is further assumed that invest- 
mcnt in physical capital is a constant fraction of profits earned. On the tech- 
ncPlogy side, Rodriguez assumes two sectors whose outputs are traded at a fixed 
international relative price. as in Bhagwati-Hamada (1974) and McCulloch- 
Ycllen (1375), but, and in contrast to both, physical capital is used in both sectors 
while only ane type of labor (skillcd or unskilled) is used in each sector. The 
mobility of capital between the sectors and the fixed terms of trade imply a 
“Denote by S, U and P = S+ U the skilled. unskilled and total population, respectively; 
by I: and c the gross rate of popula,tion growth and ttle fraction of those jlrst born getting 
educat’on; and by 111 the ratin of skillled migrants to tot.11 population. Then, the growth rates 
in thr stocks of !.killcd labor and total population are 
(lIS)(dS/dr) = (q--_nrMPIS), 
(IiPXdPldtj = g--m. 
Since both growth rates must be equal in the steady state, the equilibrium migration rate will 
be given by 
01 = -g(l -f)(SiUj+gP. 
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technologically-determinedpositice relationship between the returns to both kinds 
of labor. This makes the income distribution predic:;.ons of this model essentially 
different from those of McCulloch-Yellen (1974), where the assumptions about 
technology and international mobility of capital implied a negatir-e relationship 
between the skilled and unskilled wage rates. Education is assumed to be supplied 
by a third sector at a constant cost and capital goods are assumed to be imported 
from abroad or produced in one of the two domest’c sectors. 
The paper analyses the stability of the model, the nature of the steady-state 
solution and comparative statics, proceedin,; ;:len a la Bhagwati-Hamada to 
analyse the long-run effects of sticky real wages in the context of a Harris- 
Todaro (1970) labor market, while also exploring the short- and long-run effects 
of the implementation of a migration tax on factor rewards and unemployment. 
When wages are flexible, the most distinctive result of the model is the com- 
plete independence of all steady-state factor rewards from the costs of migration 
or the foreign wage and thus also from a migration tax. The reason for this result 
can be easily shown as follows. Denote by x the fraction of those born to 
unskilled parents who get educated, IZ the growth rate of population, U and K 
the stocks of unskilled labor and capital, and s and r the savings ratio out of 
profits and the interest rate, respectively. Then, the growth rate in the stock of the 
unskilled population equals 
(l/U)(dU/dr) = n(1 -x), (12) 
and the growth rate in the stock of capital is 
(l/X)(dK/dr) = s.r. (13) 
In the steady state, both these growth rates must be equalised and thus, in the 
steady state, we must have 
s-r = n(1 -X) (14) 
Since x depends only on the constant education cost and the skilled-unskilled 
wage differential which., in turn, depends only on the interest rate r, it follows 
that the above condition by itself determines the steady-state interest rate and, 
by implication, all other factor rewards as functions only of the educational 
costs s and n. Since none of these three variables depends in any way on the 
foreign wage or the migration cost, it follows that steady-state factor rewards 
are independent of these two variables. Notice, however, that if workers were 
also to save, the rate of growth of the capital stock would also depend cn their 
savings ratio and the shares of the different factors in national income. Since 
these shares will depend on the ratios of the different factor endowments (which 
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are endogenous variables in the steady state), the above steady-state condition 
wculd not suffice to determine all factor rewards which will now depend also on 
the other parameters of the system, including the foreign wage and the migration 
C O S i .  
A s  for the short run, Rodriguez returns to the original assumptions, showing 
that the steady-state independence of factor rewards from a migration tax does 
not prevail in the short run and that, following the imposition of such a tax, the 
returns to both types of labor will fall during the transitional period while the 
return to capital is increased. 
In conclusion, Rodriguez notes for the sticky-wage variant of his model that, 
with this amendment, it .is rather the long-run rate of unemployment that is 
independent from the foreign wage or the migration cost. However, in the 
transitional period, following an increase in the migration cost, the unemploy- 
ment rate is increased; note, however, that since Rodriguez shows that the model 
is always unstable when there is a minimum wage for skilled labor, this result 
strictly applies only to unskilled wages and unskilled unemployment. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Clearly. the preceding review suggests that the theoretical analysis of the brain 
drain, once dormant after the Grubel-Scott-Berry-Soligo-Johnson phase, has 
received a fresh lease on life with the analysis of distortions (beginning with 
Bhagwati-H:lmada) and of explicitly dynamic formulations (in Rodriguez). The 
explicit exarlination of policy options, in general-equilibrium folrmulation, is 
also recent: especially the BhaStb+ ; )e surtax on migrants has been examined, 
for its welfare impact, in r;.*:r_ral ot tb, ecent papers. 
Where can we suggest fr I~~LIII’ dvenues for f&ure theoretical work? The follow- 
ing would seem to b e ~ c W a i d l t l g  areas for general-equilibrium analysis: 
(1) The welfare of the nonemigrants may be examined for to-and-fro migra- 
tion (as noted ‘earlier) be permitting the migrant to acquire skills, wealth, etc., 
during the migration to the DCs. 
(2) The case of the migration accentuating distortions (e.g., through the 
emulation effe$::t in Bhagwati-Hamada) may be extended to the case where 
migration rcduws distortions (e.g., if a state monopsony is under-remunerating 
the emigrants’ skills, the migration could reduce the mocopsonistic power). 
(3) The posstbility that the migration could affect the foreign trade possibilities 
(i.e., the foreign ofi^er curve) via its effect on the LDCs overall national income, 
and hence on its bargaining power in a world of unequal partners or via the 
efforts exerted by the migrants in their DCs of destination on behalf of their 
LDCs of origin (e.g., Greek PTK emigrants influencing the U.S. Congress in 
favour of Greece in maeters of importance to Greecej, may also be fbrmalised. 
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